Update, November 17, 09:17 UTC. Per Scott Helme's update at Report URI: every infected Optimizely file was clean by 23:11 UTC on November 16 and has stayed clean. His final count is 188 infected snippets belonging to 178 organisations, out of 1,611 checked. The registry put 1688360[.]cc on clientHold at 00:37 UTC and webshell[.]lol at 03:37 UTC, so neither resolves. eil786npto9u5bq[.]icu no longer resolves either, and 5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icu resolves but does not answer. Between 04:11 and 05:39 UTC the attacker emptied the wallets: on-chain receipts came to about $7,150 across Bitcoin, Litecoin, TRON, Ethereum and BSC. The TRON address used for the cash-out was also used to cash out earlier operations in March 2026 and on November 3, 2026, which ties this campaign to earlier activity. Those figures cover crypto only; nobody outside the attacker yet knows how many cards, cookies or iPhones were taken. The timeline and indicators below are updated.
- What: A short loader was planted in the Optimizely project JavaScript of several major companies. Every page carrying their Optimizely snippet pulled a script from
1688360[.]ccthat swaps crypto wallet addresses, skims payment cards and steals cookies. Scott Helme raised the alarm on November 16, 2026. - Impact: Helme's team has confirmed 186 infected sites. Public scans show it on Zoom, Salesforce, GitLab, the BBC, Fox News, CNN, KLM, Scheels, American Girl and more. The attacker's Bitcoin wallet received five payments the same day.
- Fix / mitigation: Block the domains below at DNS and proxy, hunt DNS logs for them back to early November, and review who can edit your Optimizely project code.
- Who's at risk: Any iPhone or iPad on an old iOS build that opened an affected page (it was served the Coruna or DarkSword exploit kit, per Report URI), anyone who entered a card, copied a wallet address or was logged in on an affected site, and every company whose Optimizely project (or any tag manager) can be edited by more people than it should.
On the afternoon of November 16, Scott Helme posted a short warning: "We are tracking a breach of a 3rd-party JS host impacting hundreds of high value websites. This is staggering." His count of confirmed infected sites soon reached 186, and he described them as "sites that every person here will know and use."
That holds up. Patrick Duggan's analysis at DugganUSA counted 206 urlscan captures touching 1688360[.]cc by 21:30 UTC, sixteen of them well-known sites: the BBC, Fox News, CNN, Zoom, Salesforce, GitLab, KLM, Stamps.com, Smartsheet, Hootsuite, Tricentis, American Girl, Scheels and three property-management portals. Yes, American Girl and Scheels are getting got right alongside the BBC.
The captures of zoom.com, salesforce.com, about.gitlab.com and bbc.com all show the same thing: each site's own Optimizely snippet, served from cdn.optimizely.com/js/<project>.js, loading https://1688360[.]cc/track.js. None of these companies had their web servers breached. The attacker's code rode in on the experimentation script they already trusted on every page.
Who Else Was Loading It
RedEye pulled every public urlscan capture that touched 1688360[.]cc, 216 in all as of the evening of November 16. Beyond the sites above, the attacker's script was seen loading on pages of Optimizely's own website (optimizely.com), Bitly, American Eagle (ae.com), Change.org, HSBC Singapore, Air France, Virgin Media O2, IG, UNICEF USA, TSN, Mutual of Omaha, Smartsheet, Tricentis, Hootsuite, Stamps.com and two property-management portals (managebuilding.com and loftliving.com). The BBC alone accounts for 23 captures and Zoom for 7.
Optimizely's own site showing up in that list matters. It does not settle whether Optimizely was breached, but it means the loader reached at least one Optimizely property as well as its customers.
We then cross-checked those captures against the organizations RedEye works with. Three show up loading the script today: GitLab, Salesforce and Mutual of Omaha. GitLab and Salesforce are vendors whose security teams we contacted this week through our coordinated disclosure outreach, and RedEye notified the security teams at all three directly that night, with the exact pages and capture times and the full indicator set.
We also swept 1,246 company websites RedEye tracks for the loader itself. 1,024 answered, 14 run Optimizely, and none of those 14 was serving the loader when we checked on the evening of November 16. Several had republished their Optimizely file during the afternoon cleanup window, among them Alaska Airlines at 21:17 UTC, Equifax at 21:18 and Perforce at 21:32. A republish is routine and is not evidence those sites were affected; it does mean a clean file tonight says nothing about what visitors received this morning. Our sweep reads each homepage without running it, so it cannot see Optimizely snippets loaded later by a tag manager, which is how salesforce.com and gitlab.com pulled theirs.
Hop by Hop: Optimizely Was the Sixth Channel in Two Months
Patrick Duggan's hop-by-hop review at DugganUSA is the best end-to-end timeline of this operation we have seen, and it reframes the whole thing: the same operator worked through at least six third-party scripts between September 13 and November 16. Each was a script that many sites load, never a direct breach of the sites themselves. All times UTC, per DugganUSA:
- Sep 13 to Nov 10, test bed: a "connector.js" from
linkforge[.]cc, sold as an SEO backlink panel, shows up on small business sites in several countries. From Sep 17 it starts pullingwebshell[.]lol/get.js. - Oct 28: telemetry domain
l7bcsnwc7nzr3uo[.]icuregistered at Dynadot. - Nov 9, 17:52: iPhone routing domains
5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icu,je4ft3gn8vxudum[.]icuandp55abnw2pnsz0bo[.]icuregistered on one certificate (our WHOIS shows the same second). - Nov 12: the Ethereum wallet receives 4,610.72 USDC.
- Nov 13, 05:42, Kissmetrics channel: the Kissmetrics analytics script starts loading
get.js. First capture: Security Bank, Philippines. - Nov 13 to 14, StorifyMe and varors channels: the StorifyMe widget loads
get.json large publishers (Frankfurter Allgemeine, the Sydney Morning Herald, the University of Basel, vidaXL stores); a third host,varors[.]com, does the same on smaller sites. - Nov 16, 04:21, Optimizely channel: the Optimizely Project JavaScript field starts loading the injector on bbc.co.uk and bbc.com.
- Nov 16, 05:23 and 06:27: loader domains
1688360[.]ccand sibling3601688[.]ccregistered. - Nov 16, 08:28: the Optimizely injection switches to
1688360[.]cc/track.js. - Nov 16, 11:13 to 19:38: five Bitcoin payments, 0.0853 BTC. At 13:03 the Ethereum wallet sweeps 4,310.82 USDC onward.
- Nov 16, 16:26, Minute Media channel: the Fox Sports video player script loads
get.jsviaapv-static.minute-ly.com. - Nov 16, 16:38: exploit kit domains
eil786npto9u5bq[.]icu,1y69gy2mdzaltz1[.]icuandgm38duxoihbmy5o[.]icuregistered and certified under one key. - Nov 16, 23:39:
ios-hack[.]icuregistered after the campaign went public, by Censys, to take the fallback C2 away from the attacker.
DugganUSA puts the attacker's spend at roughly $100 to $500 against about $7,040 in reported crypto receipts, plus an unknown number of cards and session cookies, and assesses a Chinese-speaking, financially motivated group on cheap global infrastructure, without naming an actor or a state program. How the operator got write access to each vendor is still the open question, and it is the one that matters: six vendors in two months means this will happen again through a seventh.
How It Got Onto the Sites
Optimizely lets each customer add custom JavaScript to their project, and that code is bundled into the snippet every visitor's browser runs. In each case the attacker's addition was only a few lines: in Zoom's file, five statements that create a script tag pointing at track.js on 1688360[.]cc, load it async and swallow any errors. The same loader turned up in the project code of four unrelated companies.
That points to one of two things: a breach of the Optimizely platform itself, or an access path shared across those customer accounts, such as an agency, integration or credential that could edit all of them. Which one is not established yet, Optimizely had not commented at the time of writing, and we are not going to guess.
Timeline
- Nov 9:
p55abnw2pnsz0bo[.]icuand5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icuregistered - Nov 12: the attacker's Ethereum wallet becomes active
- Nov 13, 05:42 UTC: earliest public capture of a victim site, Security Bank's homepage calling the iOS router
- Nov 16, 11:13 UTC: first Bitcoin payment lands in the attacker's wallet
- Nov 16, 11:20 UTC: Zoom's Optimizely file is last modified with the loader in it
- Nov 16:
1688360[.]ccand three more .icu domains registered; Helme goes public - Nov 16, 19:38 UTC: fifth Bitcoin payment of the day, 0.0853 BTC in total
- Nov 16, 20:23 to 21:38 UTC: Salesforce, the BBC, GitLab and Zoom republish clean Optimizely files
- Nov 16, 23:11 UTC: every infected Optimizely file observed clean, per Report URI
- Nov 16, 23:39 UTC: Censys registers
ios-hack[.]icuto take it away from the attacker - Nov 17, 00:37 UTC:
1688360[.]ccplaced on clientHold and stops resolving - Nov 17, 03:37 UTC:
webshell[.]lol, the earlier-wave injector, placed on clientHold - Nov 17, 04:11 to 05:39 UTC: the attacker empties the Litecoin, TRON and Bitcoin wallets; the TRON cash-out address also cashed out operations in March 2026 and on November 3
How Fast RedEye Moved
Speed is the whole game with a live skimmer: every hour a loader stays up is another batch of cards and swapped wallet addresses. Here is RedEye's own clock on November 16, all times UTC, measured from the moment Helme's alert reached our analysts.
- 21:03: alert in hand. Hunt starts across the networks RedEye monitors for every attacker domain.
- 21:12: hunt complete, three days of DNS and IDS telemetry, zero hits. No RedEye-monitored network had contacted the attacker.
- 21:16: every domain enriched against the DugganUSA threat intelligence corpus.
- 21:30: continuous WHOIS and DNS monitoring live on all nine attacker domains and the hosting IP. Any re-registration, nameserver move or new address raises an alert to our analysts within five minutes.
- 21:47: this analysis published, 44 minutes after the alert, with indicators ready to block.
- 22:15: all 216 public urlscan captures cross-checked against RedEye's customer and partner base, and 1,246 company websites swept for the loader. Three exposed organizations identified: GitLab, Salesforce and Mutual of Omaha.
- 23:09: direct notifications sent to the security teams at all three, each naming the exact page and capture time we saw the loader on, with the full indicator set.
Alert to published indicators in under 45 minutes. Alert to a named list of exposed organizations in 72, and every one of them notified the same night. That is the job: find out who is exposed and tell them, while the attack is still running.
The public Optimizely CDN still served the loader for Zoom and GitLab into the evening. When RedEye pulled both files again at about 21:40 UTC they had been republished clean, GitLab at 21:29 and Zoom at 21:38. Helme's 186 includes many more sites than these four, and some may still be serving it.
What the Payload Does
track.js is about 30 KB and does three jobs, per DugganUSA's read of the file:
- Wallet swapping. A pattern matching nine kinds of wallet address rewrites matches in visible page text, the clipboard and the page's own fetch and XMLHttpRequest calls, replacing them with attacker wallets on Bitcoin, Ethereum and EVM chains, TRON, TON, Solana, Litecoin, Bitcoin Cash and Dogecoin. The victim sees a normal page and a normal paste. The money goes somewhere else.
- Card skimming. Card number, expiry and security code are posted to
1688360[.]cc/card.php. - Cookie and screen theft. Cookies, the page URL and a rendered screenshot of the page go to
1688360[.]cc/hit.php. Any session cookie not marked HttpOnly is exposed, so this reaches well past crypto users.
On touch devices it also pulls a second stage from 5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icu/boot.js, a domain that was not on Helme's list.
It is working. The attacker's Bitcoin wallet received five payments on November 16 between 11:13 and 19:38 UTC, 0.0853 BTC in total, and the first one lines up with the moment Zoom's file was changed. The Ethereum wallet has been active since November 12, which suggests the campaign started days before anyone noticed. Nobody can yet say how many of those payments came from victims.
A/B testing tools, tag managers and analytics snippets run with full control of every page they load on. Whoever can edit that project can ship code to every visitor, and most companies never review it the way they review their own code. Subresource Integrity cannot pin it either, because the file is supposed to change whenever marketing edits an experiment.
iPhones Got Exploit Kits, Not Just a Skimmer
The touch-device second stage is worse than a skimmer. Per Scott Helme's write-up at Report URI and Infostealers, the script checks for an Apple mobile device and hands it an iOS exploit loader: the Coruna exploit kit for iOS 13 through 17, and a DarkSword build for iOS 18. A separate component for iOS 26 only fingerprinted the device. DarkSword is the iOS 18 exploit chain whose code leaked publicly in March; Apple has shipped patches for it, so this targets phones that were never updated.
That changes who is at risk. A visitor who never typed a card or copied a wallet address could still have had their iPhone exploited just by opening the BBC or Zoom on an old iOS build. Update every iPhone and iPad to the current iOS now, and treat any unpatched device that browsed an affected site since early November as possibly compromised.
Inside the iOS stage
Per Hudson Rock's Infostealers analysis and Report URI, track.js pulls a router script, boot.js, from two hosts (5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icu and eil786npto9u5bq[.]icu). The router reads the iOS version and opens the matching chain in a hidden 320 by 568 iframe named chainFrame:
- iOS 13 to 17:
/A8/a.htmland/JIUJIU888/index.js, the Coruna kit. Report URI says this Coruna loader is byte-identical to a sample it analysed in October from a different campaign. - iOS 18:
/B9/,/D11/b.htmland/D12/, labelled DarkSword. The kit's own comments reportedly treat iOS 18.7.3 and later as patched. - iOS 26:
/C10/, which so far only fingerprints the device. Report URI says 26.3 and later is treated as patched.
A visible symptom: pages on iOS 18.6 or earlier reload every 60 seconds to retry the exploit. If an iPhone kept refreshing the BBC or Zoom on November 16, that device needs a closer look. Neither source has confirmed a successful exploitation on a real device, and neither says the DarkSword chain was modified; Hudson Rock ties the kit to the Caishen iOS C2 V2 lineage, a commercial kit that more than one operator can buy, so it does not name the operator.
New infrastructure from the iOS stage: fallback C2s je4ft3gn8vxudum[.]icu and ios-hack[.]icu hard-coded in boot.js, Coruna telemetry to l7bcsnwc7nzr3uo[.]icu/api/iptj, and a loader at webshell[.]lol/get.js. Code markers to hunt for in proxy and web logs: channel code 02111110, __DAILI_CFG, data-daili-gate, globalThis.obChTK, window._k7 and the visitor key ds_vk. Hudson Rock's hashes for 5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icu/boot.js (8d69f32fff37208e52dc573111e8db99f031f4913845a24fb2e14755747ac860) and /D11/b.html (792deb03483ce9b212df6f46319a78ea6fc39bfc5b2719c7e8b87d084524437d) are in the IOC list below.
One ecosystem: links to earlier Coruna and DarkSword activity
RedEye checked the iPhone stage against Coruna and DarkSword infrastructure already in our threat corpus. Three links tie this campaign to that wider kit ecosystem:
- Same DNS provider.
chainmate[.]top, already tagged DarkSword in our corpus, uses the samea.share-dns.comandb.share-dns.netnameservers as this campaign's iPhone routers5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icuandeil786npto9u5bq[.]icu. We confirmed all three live on November 17. - Same naming habit. Our Coruna set is full of random 15-character .icu names (
aygjqdr4l2s88zi[.]icu,74rcu0ntwgvtpzn[.]icu), the same shape as5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icu. It also uses the lucky-number pinyin style:faicai888(发财, "get rich") next to this campaign'sJIUJIU888path. - Shared hosts across both kits.
fc.rsqqq[.]top,st.onlinefc[.]topand66ds[.]lolappear under both Coruna and DarkSword in our data, so these are not two separate toolsets but one ecosystem serving both.
That fits Hudson Rock's link to the Caishen iOS C2 V2 kit lineage and DugganUSA's read of a Chinese-speaking, financially motivated group. It still does not name a single operator: a shared kit and shared DNS provider can serve more than one buyer. What it does say is that the iPhone stage on the BBC and Zoom was not built for this week; it plugs into infrastructure that has been delivering iOS exploits for a while.
Banks were on the list, and a bank was first
Financial sites were hit too. Re-running urlscan's public search across all three attacker hosts turns up 49 distinct sites, including:
- Security Bank (securitybank.com), the Philippine bank: its homepage called the iOS router
5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icuon November 13 at 05:42 UTC, through the Kissmetrics analytics script rather than Optimizely, per DugganUSA. That is the earliest capture of any victim site we can find, three days before Helme's alert and three days before the card skimmer host1688360[.]ccwas even registered. - HSBC Singapore: the insurance site (insurance.hsbc.com.sg) loaded
1688360[.]ccat 16:48 UTC on November 16. Report URI notes that on HSBC an inline fallback still ran throughevalwheretrack.jsitself was blocked. - IG (ig.com), the trading broker: its French site loaded
1688360[.]ccat 14:40 UTC on November 16. - Insurers: Mutual of Omaha's Medicare page, and healthinsurancecomparison.com.au.
The early captures change the story. On November 13, Security Bank, draweressentials.com, countryarcherwholesale.com, BuzzStream and a Japanese Google Workspace reseller (tscloud.co.jp) were all calling the iOS router. The iPhone exploit operation was running for at least three days before the skimmer was added on November 16, which is when the big brands lit up and people noticed. Other sites in the wider list include the Sydney Morning Herald (smh.com.au), Frankfurter Allgemeine (faz.net), the University of Basel (unibas.ch), Air France Italy, and vidaXL in four countries.
Fox Sports came in through its video player, not Optimizely
Three public urlscan captures of foxsports.com, two at 16:26 UTC and one at 23:25 UTC on November 16, show the page calling the iOS router host 5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icu and never touching 1688360[.]cc. DugganUSA's hop-by-hop analysis explains why: on Fox Sports the injector arrived through the Minute Media video player script (apv-static.minute-ly.com), a different vendor from Optimizely entirely. That also explains the 23:25 capture: Fox Sports' Optimizely file (cdn.optimizely.com/js/17902805246.js) had been republished clean at 20:35 UTC, but the video player path was a separate door. The current homepage still loads a Minute Media launcher (apv-launcher.minute-ly.com); our static fetch found no attacker domain in it as of 01:11 UTC on November 17.
Fox News needs a caveat. One urlscan capture of foxnews.com loads 1688360[.]cc at 18:25 UTC, but DugganUSA found that on Fox News, KLM and Air France the recorded caller was a client-side security product (Jscrambler or Confiant) that hooks script insertion, and does not treat those sites as compromised. We follow that reading: they appear in the captures, and the evidence that they served the payload is weaker than for the sites above.
When RedEye tried to pull the iOS stage ourselves this evening, our own DNS protection already sinkholed every one of these hosts, which is the outcome you want: block these domains at your resolver and the whole iPhone chain fails before it starts.
Indicators of Compromise
Helme published the first indicators on his X account (he also posts as @ScottHelme on Infosec Exchange). The payload names one more domain that was not on his list, and DugganUSA's write-up carries the full wallet list and file hash. Domains below are defanged.
1688360[.]cc: loader host (/track.js); 136.113.106.136, registered Nov 16eil786npto9u5bq[.]icu,1y69gy2mdzaltz1[.]icu,gm38duxoihbmy5o[.]icu: all on 34.87.36.58 (Google Cloud, Singapore), registered Nov 16p55abnw2pnsz0bo[.]icu: 34.96.213.201, registered Nov 95vobauua3ojpklx[.]icu: named in the payload, not on the published list; shares 34.96.213.201, registered Nov 9l7bcsnwc7nzr3uo[.]icu: behind Cloudflare, registered Oct 28q1ls1ho9x7wsxlu[.]icu: no longer resolving when we checkedtrack.jsSHA256f7b84b9a94f749f8ced3f0112d0a66894e8bbc3b4aa5592021d1b8976a9bad40linkforge[.]cc,niko-ngx-schema[.]com,varors[.]com,s16.varors[.]com: injectors and panels (per DugganUSA)- Related Coruna and DarkSword infrastructure (RedEye corpus):
chainmate[.]top,aygjqdr4l2s88zi[.]icu,74rcu0ntwgvtpzn[.]icu,fc.rsqqq[.]top,st.onlinefc[.]top,66ds[.]lol; nameserversa.share-dns[.]com,b.share-dns[.]net 3601688[.]cc: sibling loader domain, registered Nov 16 06:27 UTC (per DugganUSA)track.jsearlier build SHA256814a963c0da480e2449d9b6664480156e1cd6d731014117401bf635badec3a0fje4ft3gn8vxudum[.]icu,ios-hack[.]icu: fallback iOS C2s hard-coded inboot.js(per Hudson Rock and Report URI).ios-hack[.]icuis now held by Censys as a sinkhole: traffic to it means an infected or exploited device, not live attacker control.webshell[.]lol/get.js: loader (per Hudson Rock)5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icu/boot.jsSHA2568d69f32fff37208e52dc573111e8db99f031f4913845a24fb2e14755747ac860eil786npto9u5bq[.]icu/boot.jsSHA256e410b6509f33defce16ad7896cbe2fb3cc689f2cc53d87c87d75efba6b57e290/D11/b.html(DarkSword entry) SHA256792deb03483ce9b212df6f46319a78ea6fc39bfc5b2719c7e8b87d084524437d/A8/a.html(Coruna entry) SHA2569039ebbdd6abe36ad8ac48097dae6813d4a49315e1403c9ae7ebab539601cde6- iOS kit paths:
/A8/,/B9/,/C10/,/D11/,/D12/,/JIUJIU888/,/api/track,/api/gs_state,/api/pe_ok,/chain_log - Bitcoin wallet
19g9rZcPeiz8rUvyWpTRyXXhPnjsWrc3kW - Litecoin wallet
ltc1q3wp7g6ds0ggg6fl6kncpa4sepn0q3qfacgred5 - Cash-out addresses, November 17 (per Report URI): LTC
ltc1qpxvjs8u8awg8pvpwmssqlj3gzugd9vtwjtc5fc, TRONTMLQvDvpgSyx94maptc3TxvmCVtT5qHVup(also used in March 2026 and on November 3), BTCbc1q5fljq9c4g7gsjgg4etpn6k3lyusahcvjfv0u99 - Ethereum wallet
0xC4026b06D82b0F0B363eda0642D61CfbDc17884e - TRON wallet
THvs6p56XkUiMkJeSc51cAP64u2RsTYqxa - Solana wallet
FVtL8NMYS9PA1v3HE67XUGCtGA9JaZUvqav2fU2LrV5n
What the Infrastructure Tells Us
RedEye's WHOIS monitor, updated 01:20 UTC November 17. The registration records show bulk, scripted buying in batches timed to the operation:
- Nov 9, 17:52:42 UTC, one batch:
5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icu(the first iOS router),p55abnw2pnsz0bo[.]icuand the fallback C2je4ft3gn8vxudum[.]icu, all created in the same second at Global Asset Domains with its own nameservers. The iOS kit was being built a week before anyone saw it. - Nov 16, 16:38:42 UTC, second batch:
eil786npto9u5bq[.]icu(the second iOS router),1y69gy2mdzaltz1[.]icuandgm38duxoihbmy5o[.]icu, again the same registrar and the same second, while the attack was live. That matches Report URI's finding that a second iOS host was wired in between 17:13 and 17:57 UTC. - Nov 16, 05:23 UTC:
1688360[.]cc, the skimmer host, at Spaceship behind Cloudflare. - Oct 28:
l7bcsnwc7nzr3uo[.]icu, the Coruna telemetry host, at Dynadot behind Cloudflare. The oldest piece of the kit. - Nov 16, 23:39 UTC, after disclosure:
ios-hack[.]icu, one of the fallback C2 names hard-coded inboot.js, was registered at Cloudflare hours after the story broke. It was Censys, the internet scanning company, taking the fallback away from the attacker: any iPhone whoseboot.jsfalls back to that C2 now talks to a defender instead. Good work by Censys. webshell[.]lol, the loader host, dates to April 2024 at Namecheap, so not every piece of this was bought for this campaign.
Same-second registrations across separate domains mean an automated purchase, not someone clicking through a registrar by hand. Add that to the version-aware exploit delivery and this is an operator with tooling. All fifteen domains and addresses are on continuous WHOIS and DNS watch.
Five of the .icu domains were bought through the same registrar, Global Asset Domains, and use the same DNS provider. They resolve to just two Google Cloud servers. Random-looking domain names are cheap and rotate quickly, but registrar, DNS provider and hosting habits do not, and they are how the next batch gets found.
When we checked, reputation sources including VirusTotal and AbuseIPDB had little or nothing on any of these domains. Blocklists built from those sources will not catch this campaign yet, so block the domains by hand. RedEye is now monitoring every one of them for registration, DNS and hosting changes.
What to Do Now
- Block every domain above at your DNS resolver, web proxy and secure web gateway
- Search DNS and proxy logs for these domains back to early November; a hit means a browser on your network ran the payload
- Treat any crypto transfer from a device that visited an affected site as suspect until the destination address is verified another way
- If users entered card details or were logged in to affected sites, assume the card and the session are exposed: watch for card fraud and invalidate sessions
- If you use Optimizely, review your project JavaScript and its change history now, and cut editing access down to the people who need it
- Apply the same review to every tag manager and third-party snippet your sites load, and limit outbound script hosts with a Content Security Policy
RedEye Assessment
This was not a script kiddie. Look at what the operator put together: a way into the Optimizely project code of several unrelated major brands at once; a clipper covering nine chains; a card skimmer and cookie and screenshot thief; nine throwaway domains registered in waves from late October; and, for iPhones, a loader that reads the iOS version and picks the matching exploit kit, Coruna for iOS 13 through 17 and DarkSword for iOS 18, with a fingerprinting stage held back for iOS 26. Leaked exploit code lowers the bar, but wiring two kits into a version-aware delivery chain and pointing it at the audiences of the BBC, CNN and Zoom is planned, funded work. Defenders should treat it as an organized operator who will be back, not a one-off.
This is the third-party script problem at its worst: one access path, hundreds of trusted brands, and no change on any of their own servers. Zoom, the BBC, Scheels, American Girl and the rest did nothing unusual. They ran an experimentation snippet the way most of the web does. Expect the count to rise as researchers look, and expect the next domains to come from the same registrar and the same two servers. Block the indicators today, then find out who can push code to your visitors through tools that never go through code review. RedEye can help with both.
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