SUPPLY CHAIN ATTACK

Poisoned Optimizely Snippets

A Wallet Swapper and Card Skimmer Rode Into Zoom, the BBC, Scheels and American Girl Through Their A/B Testing Script

Matt Lucas  |  November 16, 2026  |  5 min
Editorial hero illustration
186
Sites confirmed infected so far
16
Household-name sites in public scans
3
Things it steals: wallets, cards, cookies
0.0853
BTC paid to the attacker on Nov 16

Update, November 17, 09:17 UTC. Per Scott Helme's update at Report URI: every infected Optimizely file was clean by 23:11 UTC on November 16 and has stayed clean. His final count is 188 infected snippets belonging to 178 organisations, out of 1,611 checked. The registry put 1688360[.]cc on clientHold at 00:37 UTC and webshell[.]lol at 03:37 UTC, so neither resolves. eil786npto9u5bq[.]icu no longer resolves either, and 5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icu resolves but does not answer. Between 04:11 and 05:39 UTC the attacker emptied the wallets: on-chain receipts came to about $7,150 across Bitcoin, Litecoin, TRON, Ethereum and BSC. The TRON address used for the cash-out was also used to cash out earlier operations in March 2026 and on November 3, 2026, which ties this campaign to earlier activity. Those figures cover crypto only; nobody outside the attacker yet knows how many cards, cookies or iPhones were taken. The timeline and indicators below are updated.

TL;DR
  • What: A short loader was planted in the Optimizely project JavaScript of several major companies. Every page carrying their Optimizely snippet pulled a script from 1688360[.]cc that swaps crypto wallet addresses, skims payment cards and steals cookies. Scott Helme raised the alarm on November 16, 2026.
  • Impact: Helme's team has confirmed 186 infected sites. Public scans show it on Zoom, Salesforce, GitLab, the BBC, Fox News, CNN, KLM, Scheels, American Girl and more. The attacker's Bitcoin wallet received five payments the same day.
  • Fix / mitigation: Block the domains below at DNS and proxy, hunt DNS logs for them back to early November, and review who can edit your Optimizely project code.
  • Who's at risk: Any iPhone or iPad on an old iOS build that opened an affected page (it was served the Coruna or DarkSword exploit kit, per Report URI), anyone who entered a card, copied a wallet address or was logged in on an affected site, and every company whose Optimizely project (or any tag manager) can be edited by more people than it should.

On the afternoon of November 16, Scott Helme posted a short warning: "We are tracking a breach of a 3rd-party JS host impacting hundreds of high value websites. This is staggering." His count of confirmed infected sites soon reached 186, and he described them as "sites that every person here will know and use."

That holds up. Patrick Duggan's analysis at DugganUSA counted 206 urlscan captures touching 1688360[.]cc by 21:30 UTC, sixteen of them well-known sites: the BBC, Fox News, CNN, Zoom, Salesforce, GitLab, KLM, Stamps.com, Smartsheet, Hootsuite, Tricentis, American Girl, Scheels and three property-management portals. Yes, American Girl and Scheels are getting got right alongside the BBC.

The captures of zoom.com, salesforce.com, about.gitlab.com and bbc.com all show the same thing: each site's own Optimizely snippet, served from cdn.optimizely.com/js/<project>.js, loading https://1688360[.]cc/track.js. None of these companies had their web servers breached. The attacker's code rode in on the experimentation script they already trusted on every page.

Who Else Was Loading It

RedEye pulled every public urlscan capture that touched 1688360[.]cc, 216 in all as of the evening of November 16. Beyond the sites above, the attacker's script was seen loading on pages of Optimizely's own website (optimizely.com), Bitly, American Eagle (ae.com), Change.org, HSBC Singapore, Air France, Virgin Media O2, IG, UNICEF USA, TSN, Mutual of Omaha, Smartsheet, Tricentis, Hootsuite, Stamps.com and two property-management portals (managebuilding.com and loftliving.com). The BBC alone accounts for 23 captures and Zoom for 7.

Optimizely's own site showing up in that list matters. It does not settle whether Optimizely was breached, but it means the loader reached at least one Optimizely property as well as its customers.

We then cross-checked those captures against the organizations RedEye works with. Three show up loading the script today: GitLab, Salesforce and Mutual of Omaha. GitLab and Salesforce are vendors whose security teams we contacted this week through our coordinated disclosure outreach, and RedEye notified the security teams at all three directly that night, with the exact pages and capture times and the full indicator set.

We also swept 1,246 company websites RedEye tracks for the loader itself. 1,024 answered, 14 run Optimizely, and none of those 14 was serving the loader when we checked on the evening of November 16. Several had republished their Optimizely file during the afternoon cleanup window, among them Alaska Airlines at 21:17 UTC, Equifax at 21:18 and Perforce at 21:32. A republish is routine and is not evidence those sites were affected; it does mean a clean file tonight says nothing about what visitors received this morning. Our sweep reads each homepage without running it, so it cannot see Optimizely snippets loaded later by a tag manager, which is how salesforce.com and gitlab.com pulled theirs.

Hop by Hop: Optimizely Was the Sixth Channel in Two Months

Patrick Duggan's hop-by-hop review at DugganUSA is the best end-to-end timeline of this operation we have seen, and it reframes the whole thing: the same operator worked through at least six third-party scripts between September 13 and November 16. Each was a script that many sites load, never a direct breach of the sites themselves. All times UTC, per DugganUSA:

DugganUSA puts the attacker's spend at roughly $100 to $500 against about $7,040 in reported crypto receipts, plus an unknown number of cards and session cookies, and assesses a Chinese-speaking, financially motivated group on cheap global infrastructure, without naming an actor or a state program. How the operator got write access to each vendor is still the open question, and it is the one that matters: six vendors in two months means this will happen again through a seventh.

How It Got Onto the Sites

Optimizely lets each customer add custom JavaScript to their project, and that code is bundled into the snippet every visitor's browser runs. In each case the attacker's addition was only a few lines: in Zoom's file, five statements that create a script tag pointing at track.js on 1688360[.]cc, load it async and swallow any errors. The same loader turned up in the project code of four unrelated companies.

That points to one of two things: a breach of the Optimizely platform itself, or an access path shared across those customer accounts, such as an agency, integration or credential that could edit all of them. Which one is not established yet, Optimizely had not commented at the time of writing, and we are not going to guess.

Timeline

How Fast RedEye Moved

Speed is the whole game with a live skimmer: every hour a loader stays up is another batch of cards and swapped wallet addresses. Here is RedEye's own clock on November 16, all times UTC, measured from the moment Helme's alert reached our analysts.

Alert to published indicators in under 45 minutes. Alert to a named list of exposed organizations in 72, and every one of them notified the same night. That is the job: find out who is exposed and tell them, while the attack is still running.

The public Optimizely CDN still served the loader for Zoom and GitLab into the evening. When RedEye pulled both files again at about 21:40 UTC they had been republished clean, GitLab at 21:29 and Zoom at 21:38. Helme's 186 includes many more sites than these four, and some may still be serving it.

What the Payload Does

track.js is about 30 KB and does three jobs, per DugganUSA's read of the file:

On touch devices it also pulls a second stage from 5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icu/boot.js, a domain that was not on Helme's list.

It is working. The attacker's Bitcoin wallet received five payments on November 16 between 11:13 and 19:38 UTC, 0.0853 BTC in total, and the first one lines up with the moment Zoom's file was changed. The Ethereum wallet has been active since November 12, which suggests the campaign started days before anyone noticed. Nobody can yet say how many of those payments came from victims.

The tag manager is the perimeter

A/B testing tools, tag managers and analytics snippets run with full control of every page they load on. Whoever can edit that project can ship code to every visitor, and most companies never review it the way they review their own code. Subresource Integrity cannot pin it either, because the file is supposed to change whenever marketing edits an experiment.

iPhones Got Exploit Kits, Not Just a Skimmer

The touch-device second stage is worse than a skimmer. Per Scott Helme's write-up at Report URI and Infostealers, the script checks for an Apple mobile device and hands it an iOS exploit loader: the Coruna exploit kit for iOS 13 through 17, and a DarkSword build for iOS 18. A separate component for iOS 26 only fingerprinted the device. DarkSword is the iOS 18 exploit chain whose code leaked publicly in March; Apple has shipped patches for it, so this targets phones that were never updated.

That changes who is at risk. A visitor who never typed a card or copied a wallet address could still have had their iPhone exploited just by opening the BBC or Zoom on an old iOS build. Update every iPhone and iPad to the current iOS now, and treat any unpatched device that browsed an affected site since early November as possibly compromised.

Inside the iOS stage

Per Hudson Rock's Infostealers analysis and Report URI, track.js pulls a router script, boot.js, from two hosts (5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icu and eil786npto9u5bq[.]icu). The router reads the iOS version and opens the matching chain in a hidden 320 by 568 iframe named chainFrame:

A visible symptom: pages on iOS 18.6 or earlier reload every 60 seconds to retry the exploit. If an iPhone kept refreshing the BBC or Zoom on November 16, that device needs a closer look. Neither source has confirmed a successful exploitation on a real device, and neither says the DarkSword chain was modified; Hudson Rock ties the kit to the Caishen iOS C2 V2 lineage, a commercial kit that more than one operator can buy, so it does not name the operator.

New infrastructure from the iOS stage: fallback C2s je4ft3gn8vxudum[.]icu and ios-hack[.]icu hard-coded in boot.js, Coruna telemetry to l7bcsnwc7nzr3uo[.]icu/api/iptj, and a loader at webshell[.]lol/get.js. Code markers to hunt for in proxy and web logs: channel code 02111110, __DAILI_CFG, data-daili-gate, globalThis.obChTK, window._k7 and the visitor key ds_vk. Hudson Rock's hashes for 5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icu/boot.js (8d69f32fff37208e52dc573111e8db99f031f4913845a24fb2e14755747ac860) and /D11/b.html (792deb03483ce9b212df6f46319a78ea6fc39bfc5b2719c7e8b87d084524437d) are in the IOC list below.

One ecosystem: links to earlier Coruna and DarkSword activity

RedEye checked the iPhone stage against Coruna and DarkSword infrastructure already in our threat corpus. Three links tie this campaign to that wider kit ecosystem:

That fits Hudson Rock's link to the Caishen iOS C2 V2 kit lineage and DugganUSA's read of a Chinese-speaking, financially motivated group. It still does not name a single operator: a shared kit and shared DNS provider can serve more than one buyer. What it does say is that the iPhone stage on the BBC and Zoom was not built for this week; it plugs into infrastructure that has been delivering iOS exploits for a while.

Banks were on the list, and a bank was first

Financial sites were hit too. Re-running urlscan's public search across all three attacker hosts turns up 49 distinct sites, including:

The early captures change the story. On November 13, Security Bank, draweressentials.com, countryarcherwholesale.com, BuzzStream and a Japanese Google Workspace reseller (tscloud.co.jp) were all calling the iOS router. The iPhone exploit operation was running for at least three days before the skimmer was added on November 16, which is when the big brands lit up and people noticed. Other sites in the wider list include the Sydney Morning Herald (smh.com.au), Frankfurter Allgemeine (faz.net), the University of Basel (unibas.ch), Air France Italy, and vidaXL in four countries.

Fox Sports came in through its video player, not Optimizely

Three public urlscan captures of foxsports.com, two at 16:26 UTC and one at 23:25 UTC on November 16, show the page calling the iOS router host 5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icu and never touching 1688360[.]cc. DugganUSA's hop-by-hop analysis explains why: on Fox Sports the injector arrived through the Minute Media video player script (apv-static.minute-ly.com), a different vendor from Optimizely entirely. That also explains the 23:25 capture: Fox Sports' Optimizely file (cdn.optimizely.com/js/17902805246.js) had been republished clean at 20:35 UTC, but the video player path was a separate door. The current homepage still loads a Minute Media launcher (apv-launcher.minute-ly.com); our static fetch found no attacker domain in it as of 01:11 UTC on November 17.

Fox News needs a caveat. One urlscan capture of foxnews.com loads 1688360[.]cc at 18:25 UTC, but DugganUSA found that on Fox News, KLM and Air France the recorded caller was a client-side security product (Jscrambler or Confiant) that hooks script insertion, and does not treat those sites as compromised. We follow that reading: they appear in the captures, and the evidence that they served the payload is weaker than for the sites above.

When RedEye tried to pull the iOS stage ourselves this evening, our own DNS protection already sinkholed every one of these hosts, which is the outcome you want: block these domains at your resolver and the whole iPhone chain fails before it starts.

Indicators of Compromise

Helme published the first indicators on his X account (he also posts as @ScottHelme on Infosec Exchange). The payload names one more domain that was not on his list, and DugganUSA's write-up carries the full wallet list and file hash. Domains below are defanged.

What the Infrastructure Tells Us

RedEye's WHOIS monitor, updated 01:20 UTC November 17. The registration records show bulk, scripted buying in batches timed to the operation:

Same-second registrations across separate domains mean an automated purchase, not someone clicking through a registrar by hand. Add that to the version-aware exploit delivery and this is an operator with tooling. All fifteen domains and addresses are on continuous WHOIS and DNS watch.

Five of the .icu domains were bought through the same registrar, Global Asset Domains, and use the same DNS provider. They resolve to just two Google Cloud servers. Random-looking domain names are cheap and rotate quickly, but registrar, DNS provider and hosting habits do not, and they are how the next batch gets found.

When we checked, reputation sources including VirusTotal and AbuseIPDB had little or nothing on any of these domains. Blocklists built from those sources will not catch this campaign yet, so block the domains by hand. RedEye is now monitoring every one of them for registration, DNS and hosting changes.

What to Do Now

RedEye Assessment

This was not a script kiddie. Look at what the operator put together: a way into the Optimizely project code of several unrelated major brands at once; a clipper covering nine chains; a card skimmer and cookie and screenshot thief; nine throwaway domains registered in waves from late October; and, for iPhones, a loader that reads the iOS version and picks the matching exploit kit, Coruna for iOS 13 through 17 and DarkSword for iOS 18, with a fingerprinting stage held back for iOS 26. Leaked exploit code lowers the bar, but wiring two kits into a version-aware delivery chain and pointing it at the audiences of the BBC, CNN and Zoom is planned, funded work. Defenders should treat it as an organized operator who will be back, not a one-off.

This is the third-party script problem at its worst: one access path, hundreds of trusted brands, and no change on any of their own servers. Zoom, the BBC, Scheels, American Girl and the rest did nothing unusual. They ran an experimentation snippet the way most of the web does. Expect the count to rise as researchers look, and expect the next domains to come from the same registrar and the same two servers. Block the indicators today, then find out who can push code to your visitors through tools that never go through code review. RedEye can help with both.

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