SUPPLY CHAIN ATTACK

Poisoned Optimizely Snippets

A Wallet Swapper and Card Skimmer Rode Into Zoom, the BBC, Scheels and American Girl Through Their A/B Testing Script

Matt Lucas  |  November 16, 2026  |  5 min
Editorial hero illustration
186
Sites confirmed infected so far
16
Household-name sites in public scans
3
Things it steals: wallets, cards, cookies
0.0853
BTC paid to the attacker on Nov 16
TL;DR
  • What: A short loader was planted in the Optimizely project JavaScript of several major companies. Every page carrying their Optimizely snippet pulled a script from 1688360[.]cc that swaps crypto wallet addresses, skims payment cards and steals cookies. Scott Helme raised the alarm on November 16, 2026.
  • Impact: Helme's team has confirmed 186 infected sites. Public scans show it on Zoom, Salesforce, GitLab, the BBC, Fox News, CNN, KLM, Scheels, American Girl and more. The attacker's Bitcoin wallet received five payments the same day.
  • Fix / mitigation: Block the domains below at DNS and proxy, hunt DNS logs for them back to early November, and review who can edit your Optimizely project code.
  • Who's at risk: Anyone who entered a card, copied a wallet address or was logged in on an affected site, and every company whose Optimizely project (or any tag manager) can be edited by more people than it should.

On the afternoon of November 16, Scott Helme posted a short warning: "We are tracking a breach of a 3rd-party JS host impacting hundreds of high value websites. This is staggering." His count of confirmed infected sites soon reached 186, and he described them as "sites that every person here will know and use."

That holds up. Patrick Duggan's analysis at DugganUSA counted 206 urlscan captures touching 1688360[.]cc by 21:30 UTC, sixteen of them well-known sites: the BBC, Fox News, CNN, Zoom, Salesforce, GitLab, KLM, Stamps.com, Smartsheet, Hootsuite, Tricentis, American Girl, Scheels and three property-management portals. Yes, American Girl and Scheels are getting got right alongside the BBC.

The captures of zoom.com, salesforce.com, about.gitlab.com and bbc.com all show the same thing: each site's own Optimizely snippet, served from cdn.optimizely.com/js/<project>.js, loading https://1688360[.]cc/track.js. None of these companies had their web servers breached. The attacker's code rode in on the experimentation script they already trusted on every page.

Who Else Was Loading It

RedEye pulled every public urlscan capture that touched 1688360[.]cc, 216 in all as of the evening of November 16. Beyond the sites above, the attacker's script was seen loading on pages of Optimizely's own website (optimizely.com), Bitly, American Eagle (ae.com), Change.org, HSBC Singapore, Air France, Virgin Media O2, IG, UNICEF USA, TSN, Mutual of Omaha, Smartsheet, Tricentis, Hootsuite, Stamps.com and two property-management portals (managebuilding.com and loftliving.com). The BBC alone accounts for 23 captures and Zoom for 7.

Optimizely's own site showing up in that list matters. It does not settle whether Optimizely was breached, but it means the loader reached at least one Optimizely property as well as its customers.

We then cross-checked those captures against the organizations RedEye works with. Three show up loading the script today: GitLab, Salesforce and Mutual of Omaha. GitLab and Salesforce are vendors whose security teams we contacted this week through our coordinated disclosure outreach, and we are reaching out to all three directly.

We also swept 1,246 company websites RedEye tracks for the loader itself. 1,024 answered, 14 run Optimizely, and none of those 14 was serving the loader when we checked on the evening of November 16. Several had republished their Optimizely file during the afternoon cleanup window, among them Alaska Airlines at 21:17 UTC, Equifax at 21:18 and Perforce at 21:32. A republish is routine and is not evidence those sites were affected; it does mean a clean file tonight says nothing about what visitors received this morning. Our sweep reads each homepage without running it, so it cannot see Optimizely snippets loaded later by a tag manager, which is how salesforce.com and gitlab.com pulled theirs.

How It Got Onto the Sites

Optimizely lets each customer add custom JavaScript to their project, and that code is bundled into the snippet every visitor's browser runs. In each case the attacker's addition was only a few lines: in Zoom's file, five statements that create a script tag pointing at track.js on 1688360[.]cc, load it async and swallow any errors. The same loader turned up in the project code of four unrelated companies.

That points to one of two things: a breach of the Optimizely platform itself, or an access path shared across those customer accounts, such as an agency, integration or credential that could edit all of them. Which one is not established yet, Optimizely had not commented at the time of writing, and we are not going to guess.

Timeline

The public Optimizely CDN still served the loader for Zoom and GitLab into the evening. When RedEye pulled both files again at about 21:40 UTC they had been republished clean, GitLab at 21:29 and Zoom at 21:38. Helme's 186 includes many more sites than these four, and some may still be serving it.

What the Payload Does

track.js is about 30 KB and does three jobs, per DugganUSA's read of the file:

On touch devices it also pulls a second stage from 5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icu/boot.js, a domain that was not on Helme's list.

It is working. The attacker's Bitcoin wallet received five payments on November 16 between 11:13 and 19:38 UTC, 0.0853 BTC in total, and the first one lines up with the moment Zoom's file was changed. The Ethereum wallet has been active since November 12, which suggests the campaign started days before anyone noticed. Nobody can yet say how many of those payments came from victims.

The tag manager is the perimeter

A/B testing tools, tag managers and analytics snippets run with full control of every page they load on. Whoever can edit that project can ship code to every visitor, and most companies never review it the way they review their own code. Subresource Integrity cannot pin it either, because the file is supposed to change whenever marketing edits an experiment.

Indicators of Compromise

Helme published the first indicators on his X account (he also posts as @ScottHelme on Infosec Exchange). The payload names one more domain that was not on his list, and DugganUSA's write-up carries the full wallet list and file hash. Domains below are defanged.

What the Infrastructure Tells Us

Five of the .icu domains were bought through the same registrar, Global Asset Domains, and use the same DNS provider. They resolve to just two Google Cloud servers. Random-looking domain names are cheap and rotate quickly, but registrar, DNS provider and hosting habits do not, and they are how the next batch gets found.

When we checked, reputation sources including VirusTotal and AbuseIPDB had little or nothing on any of these domains. Blocklists built from those sources will not catch this campaign yet, so block the domains by hand. RedEye is now monitoring every one of them for registration, DNS and hosting changes.

What to Do Now

RedEye Assessment

This is the third-party script problem at its worst: one access path, hundreds of trusted brands, and no change on any of their own servers. Zoom, the BBC, Scheels, American Girl and the rest did nothing unusual. They ran an experimentation snippet the way most of the web does. Expect the count to rise as researchers look, and expect the next domains to come from the same registrar and the same two servers. Block the indicators today, then find out who can push code to your visitors through tools that never go through code review. RedEye can help with both.

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