- What: A short loader was planted in the Optimizely project JavaScript of several major companies. Every page carrying their Optimizely snippet pulled a script from
1688360[.]ccthat swaps crypto wallet addresses, skims payment cards and steals cookies. Scott Helme raised the alarm on November 16, 2026. - Impact: Helme's team has confirmed 186 infected sites. Public scans show it on Zoom, Salesforce, GitLab, the BBC, Fox News, CNN, KLM, Scheels, American Girl and more. The attacker's Bitcoin wallet received five payments the same day.
- Fix / mitigation: Block the domains below at DNS and proxy, hunt DNS logs for them back to early November, and review who can edit your Optimizely project code.
- Who's at risk: Anyone who entered a card, copied a wallet address or was logged in on an affected site, and every company whose Optimizely project (or any tag manager) can be edited by more people than it should.
On the afternoon of November 16, Scott Helme posted a short warning: "We are tracking a breach of a 3rd-party JS host impacting hundreds of high value websites. This is staggering." His count of confirmed infected sites soon reached 186, and he described them as "sites that every person here will know and use."
That holds up. Patrick Duggan's analysis at DugganUSA counted 206 urlscan captures touching 1688360[.]cc by 21:30 UTC, sixteen of them well-known sites: the BBC, Fox News, CNN, Zoom, Salesforce, GitLab, KLM, Stamps.com, Smartsheet, Hootsuite, Tricentis, American Girl, Scheels and three property-management portals. Yes, American Girl and Scheels are getting got right alongside the BBC.
The captures of zoom.com, salesforce.com, about.gitlab.com and bbc.com all show the same thing: each site's own Optimizely snippet, served from cdn.optimizely.com/js/<project>.js, loading https://1688360[.]cc/track.js. None of these companies had their web servers breached. The attacker's code rode in on the experimentation script they already trusted on every page.
Who Else Was Loading It
RedEye pulled every public urlscan capture that touched 1688360[.]cc, 216 in all as of the evening of November 16. Beyond the sites above, the attacker's script was seen loading on pages of Optimizely's own website (optimizely.com), Bitly, American Eagle (ae.com), Change.org, HSBC Singapore, Air France, Virgin Media O2, IG, UNICEF USA, TSN, Mutual of Omaha, Smartsheet, Tricentis, Hootsuite, Stamps.com and two property-management portals (managebuilding.com and loftliving.com). The BBC alone accounts for 23 captures and Zoom for 7.
Optimizely's own site showing up in that list matters. It does not settle whether Optimizely was breached, but it means the loader reached at least one Optimizely property as well as its customers.
We then cross-checked those captures against the organizations RedEye works with. Three show up loading the script today: GitLab, Salesforce and Mutual of Omaha. GitLab and Salesforce are vendors whose security teams we contacted this week through our coordinated disclosure outreach, and we are reaching out to all three directly.
We also swept 1,246 company websites RedEye tracks for the loader itself. 1,024 answered, 14 run Optimizely, and none of those 14 was serving the loader when we checked on the evening of November 16. Several had republished their Optimizely file during the afternoon cleanup window, among them Alaska Airlines at 21:17 UTC, Equifax at 21:18 and Perforce at 21:32. A republish is routine and is not evidence those sites were affected; it does mean a clean file tonight says nothing about what visitors received this morning. Our sweep reads each homepage without running it, so it cannot see Optimizely snippets loaded later by a tag manager, which is how salesforce.com and gitlab.com pulled theirs.
How It Got Onto the Sites
Optimizely lets each customer add custom JavaScript to their project, and that code is bundled into the snippet every visitor's browser runs. In each case the attacker's addition was only a few lines: in Zoom's file, five statements that create a script tag pointing at track.js on 1688360[.]cc, load it async and swallow any errors. The same loader turned up in the project code of four unrelated companies.
That points to one of two things: a breach of the Optimizely platform itself, or an access path shared across those customer accounts, such as an agency, integration or credential that could edit all of them. Which one is not established yet, Optimizely had not commented at the time of writing, and we are not going to guess.
Timeline
- Nov 9:
p55abnw2pnsz0bo[.]icuand5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icuregistered - Nov 12: the attacker's Ethereum wallet becomes active
- Nov 16, 11:13 UTC: first Bitcoin payment lands in the attacker's wallet
- Nov 16, 11:20 UTC: Zoom's Optimizely file is last modified with the loader in it
- Nov 16:
1688360[.]ccand three more .icu domains registered; Helme goes public - Nov 16, 19:38 UTC: fifth Bitcoin payment of the day, 0.0853 BTC in total
- Nov 16, 20:23 to 21:38 UTC: Salesforce, the BBC, GitLab and Zoom republish clean Optimizely files
The public Optimizely CDN still served the loader for Zoom and GitLab into the evening. When RedEye pulled both files again at about 21:40 UTC they had been republished clean, GitLab at 21:29 and Zoom at 21:38. Helme's 186 includes many more sites than these four, and some may still be serving it.
What the Payload Does
track.js is about 30 KB and does three jobs, per DugganUSA's read of the file:
- Wallet swapping. A pattern matching nine kinds of wallet address rewrites matches in visible page text, the clipboard and the page's own fetch and XMLHttpRequest calls, replacing them with attacker wallets on Bitcoin, Ethereum and EVM chains, TRON, TON, Solana, Litecoin, Bitcoin Cash and Dogecoin. The victim sees a normal page and a normal paste. The money goes somewhere else.
- Card skimming. Card number, expiry and security code are posted to
1688360[.]cc/card.php. - Cookie and screen theft. Cookies, the page URL and a rendered screenshot of the page go to
1688360[.]cc/hit.php. Any session cookie not marked HttpOnly is exposed, so this reaches well past crypto users.
On touch devices it also pulls a second stage from 5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icu/boot.js, a domain that was not on Helme's list.
It is working. The attacker's Bitcoin wallet received five payments on November 16 between 11:13 and 19:38 UTC, 0.0853 BTC in total, and the first one lines up with the moment Zoom's file was changed. The Ethereum wallet has been active since November 12, which suggests the campaign started days before anyone noticed. Nobody can yet say how many of those payments came from victims.
A/B testing tools, tag managers and analytics snippets run with full control of every page they load on. Whoever can edit that project can ship code to every visitor, and most companies never review it the way they review their own code. Subresource Integrity cannot pin it either, because the file is supposed to change whenever marketing edits an experiment.
Indicators of Compromise
Helme published the first indicators on his X account (he also posts as @ScottHelme on Infosec Exchange). The payload names one more domain that was not on his list, and DugganUSA's write-up carries the full wallet list and file hash. Domains below are defanged.
1688360[.]cc: loader host (/track.js); 136.113.106.136, registered Nov 16eil786npto9u5bq[.]icu,1y69gy2mdzaltz1[.]icu,gm38duxoihbmy5o[.]icu: all on 34.87.36.58 (Google Cloud, Singapore), registered Nov 16p55abnw2pnsz0bo[.]icu: 34.96.213.201, registered Nov 95vobauua3ojpklx[.]icu: named in the payload, not on the published list; shares 34.96.213.201, registered Nov 9l7bcsnwc7nzr3uo[.]icu: behind Cloudflare, registered Oct 28q1ls1ho9x7wsxlu[.]icu: no longer resolving when we checkedtrack.jsSHA256f7b84b9a94f749f8ced3f0112d0a66894e8bbc3b4aa5592021d1b8976a9bad40- Bitcoin wallet
19g9rZcPeiz8rUvyWpTRyXXhPnjsWrc3kW - Ethereum wallet
0xC4026b06D82b0F0B363eda0642D61CfbDc17884e - TRON wallet
THvs6p56XkUiMkJeSc51cAP64u2RsTYqxa - Solana wallet
FVtL8NMYS9PA1v3HE67XUGCtGA9JaZUvqav2fU2LrV5n
What the Infrastructure Tells Us
Five of the .icu domains were bought through the same registrar, Global Asset Domains, and use the same DNS provider. They resolve to just two Google Cloud servers. Random-looking domain names are cheap and rotate quickly, but registrar, DNS provider and hosting habits do not, and they are how the next batch gets found.
When we checked, reputation sources including VirusTotal and AbuseIPDB had little or nothing on any of these domains. Blocklists built from those sources will not catch this campaign yet, so block the domains by hand. RedEye is now monitoring every one of them for registration, DNS and hosting changes.
What to Do Now
- Block every domain above at your DNS resolver, web proxy and secure web gateway
- Search DNS and proxy logs for these domains back to early November; a hit means a browser on your network ran the payload
- Treat any crypto transfer from a device that visited an affected site as suspect until the destination address is verified another way
- If users entered card details or were logged in to affected sites, assume the card and the session are exposed: watch for card fraud and invalidate sessions
- If you use Optimizely, review your project JavaScript and its change history now, and cut editing access down to the people who need it
- Apply the same review to every tag manager and third-party snippet your sites load, and limit outbound script hosts with a Content Security Policy
RedEye Assessment
This is the third-party script problem at its worst: one access path, hundreds of trusted brands, and no change on any of their own servers. Zoom, the BBC, Scheels, American Girl and the rest did nothing unusual. They ran an experimentation snippet the way most of the web does. Expect the count to rise as researchers look, and expect the next domains to come from the same registrar and the same two servers. Block the indicators today, then find out who can push code to your visitors through tools that never go through code review. RedEye can help with both.
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