VULNERABILITY

nginx2root: Check Your nginx, Turn HTTP/2 Off, Patch to 1.30.7

Every nginx with HTTP/2 since 2015 carries a heap corruption bug reported to give code execution. Fixes are out in 1.30.7 and 1.31.9. Here is the five minute check, the interim fix, and what we found on our own network.

Matt Lucas  |  November 18, 2026  |  6 min
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CVEs in this postCVE-2026-113425CVE-2026-118899CVE-2026-121810CVE-2026-123007CVE-2026-123633CVE-2026-123634Live detections →All RedEye CVEs →
2015
Year the HTTP/2 bug arrived (1.9.5)
1.30.7
Fixed stable build (mainline 1.31.9)
7
Of our own listeners we turned HTTP/2 off on
0
In-the-wild attacks reported so far
Detected by CaverLive detection for 6 CVEs in the RedEye Intel Feed →

Status, November 18, 2026. The nginx.org security advisories page now lists fixes in 1.30.7 (stable) and 1.31.9 (mainline) for the nginx2root set. Earlier in the day DugganUSA checked nginx.org and found no advisory and no fixed build, so if your distribution has not shipped a package yet, their advice still holds: turn HTTP/2 off. We are updating this post as packages and images land.

TL;DR
  • The bug: CVE-2026-123007, memory corruption in nginx's HTTP/2 flow control, rated Major by nginx. It affects 1.9.5 through 1.31.8, which is every nginx that has had HTTP/2 since 2015. Xint, who named the set "nginx2root", reports code execution as the worker user with no backend and no extra modules needed. Wiz reports reproducing it against nginx serving plain static files.
  • The rest of the set: an HTTP/2 use-after-free (CVE-2026-123633), an HTTP/3 use-after-free, a resolver use-after-free, a mail proxy use-after-free, and a TLS 1.3 request body infinite loop, all fixed in the same builds.
  • Do now: find every nginx you run, including ingress controllers, appliances and container images. Upgrade to 1.30.7 or 1.31.9. Until you can, set http2 off; and fully restart nginx, because a reload leaves the old workers serving open HTTP/2 connections.
  • What we did: we found seven internal nginx listeners with HTTP/2 on: six on 1.30.6 and our single sign-on proxy on 1.27.5. HTTP/2 was off on all seven within the hour, and we verified that each one now negotiates HTTP/1.1 only. The commands are below.

What Was Disclosed

On November 18 Xint published "NGINX2Root": five nginx remote code execution bugs, plus a separate Linux kernel bug they chained with one of them to get from the nginx worker to host root and out of a Docker container. The headline bug, CVE-2026-123007, is an integer overflow in HTTP/2 flow-control accounting that corrupts the heap. According to Xint, one researcher found it while preparing for a hacking competition, and an automated scan found the other four.

The nginx.org advisory list now carries the set with fixed versions:

CVEWhatnginx severityVulnerableNeeds
CVE-2026-123007HTTP/2 flow control memory corruptionMajor1.9.5 to 1.31.8HTTP/2 enabled
CVE-2026-123633HTTP/2 use-after-freeMedium1.19.7 to 1.31.8HTTP/2 over TLS with proxy_pass (per Xint)
CVE-2026-121810HTTP/3 use-after-freeMedium1.25.0 to 1.31.8HTTP/3 (QUIC) with an upstream
CVE-2026-123634Resolver use-after-freeMedium0.6.18 to 1.31.8A resolver and a proxy_pass built from the request
CVE-2026-113425Mail proxy use-after-freeMajor0.5.33 to 1.31.8A mail block with auth_http
CVE-2026-118899Infinite loop reading a request body over TLS 1.3Major1.13.0 to 1.31.8TLS 1.3

Fixed in 1.30.7 and 1.31.9. The same advisory batch also fixes several minor and medium stream and PROXY protocol bugs.

How Bad Is It, Really

Reachability is broad: HTTP/2 is on by default in many distribution configs, cloud images and ingress controllers. Every TLS site that a modern browser reaches over HTTP/2 is a candidate. The bar for a working exploit is higher than the headline suggests. Rapid7's analysis, as reported by SecurityOnline, says the exploit needs a large amount of traffic (about 128 GB of HTTP/2 data) and depends on ASLR being off or bypassed. It also says the code runs as the nginx worker, not root. Root comes from the separate kernel bug in Xint's chain. A public proof of concept has been reported. DugganUSA had found no exploit code when they checked, and no exploitation in the wild has been reported so far.

Treat it as patch-now anyway. Exploits only get cheaper, and a worker shell on a reverse proxy sees every request and every upstream credential that passes through it.

Check Yourself in Five Minutes

Run these against every nginx you own, including the ones inside containers (docker exec <name> ...):

# version (vulnerable: 1.9.5 to 1.31.8, fixed: 1.30.7 / 1.31.9)
nginx -v

# is HTTP/2 or HTTP/3 on anywhere in the effective config?
nginx -T 2>/dev/null | grep -nE 'http2|http3|quic'

# from outside: what does the listener actually negotiate?
curl -sk --http2 -o /dev/null -w '%{http_version}\n' https://your.host:443/
# "2" means HTTP/2 is live; "1.1" means it is not

Check distribution changelogs as well as version strings: a backported fix may not change the version number.

The Interim Fix: Turn HTTP/2 Off

Browsers fall back to HTTP/1.1 without complaint. Most sites will not notice the change beyond slightly slower page loads with many assets.

What We Found on Our Own Network

We ran the checks above on our own infrastructure as soon as the advisory dropped. Seven internal nginx listeners had http2 on: six reverse proxies in front of internal dashboards and tools on nginx 1.30.6, and the proxy in front of our single sign-on on 1.27.5. The sign-on proxy matters most, because every login passes through it. None had HTTP/3 enabled, and none use a mail proxy or a request-built proxy_pass. Seven more nginx containers across our hosts ran vulnerable versions with HTTP/2 already off. They are not exposed to the HTTP/2 bugs, but they still get the upgrade.

We set http2 off; on all seven and restarted each container fully. We then checked from another machine with curl: every listener now negotiates HTTP/1.1. We made the same change in the configs those services deploy from, so a redeploy cannot bring HTTP/2 back. The images move to 1.30.7 as soon as the official image is published, and HTTP/2 stays off until then. Total time from reading the advisory to the last verified listener was under an hour, and nothing broke.

We are also adding this check to the external assessments we run for clients: the nginx version from the Server header plus whether the site negotiates HTTP/2.

Detection

These are frame-level bugs, so a WAF or access log does not see the payload. What you can watch:

Sources

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